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Abstract 
This thesis documents a strong momentum effect in the Nordic stock market that does not seem 
to be explained by traditional risk factors or industry effects, in contrast to the findings of 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). Specifically, the winner-minus-loser (WML) strategy on both 
the individual stock- and industry level is significantly profitable alone, but only individual 
stock momentum remains significant when controlling for the other. This indicates that the 
individual stock WML strategy is not as poorly diversified as initially thought and that the 
identified industry dependency in the United States may be country-specific. 
Having established that industry effects do not explain the momentum in Nordic stock returns, 
I explore momentum crashes as another possible explanation. The WML strategies are found 
to suffer from severe drawdowns in the sample period, making them unappealing to investors 
with reasonable risk-aversion. The explored combinations of momentum and value reduce 
crash risk and improve risk-adjusted returns significantly. In conclusion, the combination of 
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In recent years, the asset pricing anomaly of momentum investing has been researched 
extensively. An investor can earn significant abnormal returns when buying past winners and 
selling past losers. The robust success of this strategy has made way for funds specialized in 
exploiting the momentum effect systematically1. An increase in both knowledge and investors 
trying to exploit the anomaly is expected to reduce the strategy's profitability, yet the effect 
persists. Although there is little doubt regarding the anomaly's existence, more uncertainty is 
related to its source. Despite several attempts in explaining this pattern in stock returns, 
momentum remains one of the most central anomalies challenging the notion of efficient 
markets. 
This thesis pursues industry effects as a possible explanation for the momentum anomaly in 
the Nordic stock market. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that industry effects drive the 
momentum identified in U.S. stock returns. Consequently, an individual stock momentum 
strategy is poorly diversified, thus more susceptible to idiosyncratic risk as companies within 
industries tend to be more highly correlated. Motivated by Moskowitz and Grinblatt, I 
hypothesize that the abnormal returns of a winner-minus-loser (WML) strategy in the Nordic 
stock market are mainly driven by industry outperformance rather than individual stock 
characteristics. This trend has been somewhat visible in recent years, as companies within, for 
example, the technology and renewable energy industry tend to perform well, regardless of 
actual company performance. 
As an additional contribution to existing research, this thesis aims to further explore possible 
ways to reduce the risk of crashes related to momentum investing. A pure-play momentum 
strategy has historically produced the highest Sharpe ratio compared to the market or a value 
strategy. However, as identified by Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), the strategy has also suffered 
from the worst crashes, making it unappealing to investors with reasonable risk aversion. 
Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) find the individual stock momentum strategy to be 
negatively correlated with the value strategy and, consequently, a simple weighted combination 
of the two strategies increases risk-adjusted returns significantly. These findings suggest that 
 
1 An example: AQR Capital Management with focus on factor investing, using the momentum effect, the value 
premium, and both combined in their strategies. Website: https://www.aqr.com/.  
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crash risk reductions and significant improvements to the plain momentum strategy are 
possible and available in the United States and lays the foundation for research out-of-sample. 
Academic papers of which purpose is to explain return anomalies seem to be almost exclusively 
focusing on the U.S. stock market. Consequently, country-specific effects are often not 
accounted for within these types of analyses. Compared to the U.S. stock market, the Nordic 
countries are unexplored and under-researched, despite being young yet developed markets. 
This lack of coverage makes for an exciting research environment, and, consequently, the 
Nordic stock market will be the focus of this thesis. By exploring this market, I contribute by 
testing the findings of existing literature out-of-sample. Furthermore, besides the dot-com 
bubble and financial crisis, the sample period includes the Covid-19 pandemic, adding a new 
extreme market event to the research. 
In short, this thesis will explore an investor's ability to generate significant abnormal returns 
by applying a pure-play momentum strategy in the Nordic stock market. Next, motivated by 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), I explore industry effects as the main driver behind the 
momentum in Nordic stock returns. Lastly, I combine momentum and value to deal with the 
risks relating to momentum investing and increase the risk-adjusted returns of the individual 
stock momentum strategy. This sums to the following research questions: 
1. How profitable is a plain momentum strategy in the Nordics, with what risk and 
drawdowns? 
2. Can an industry momentum effect be identified in the Nordics, and to what degree is it 
the driver behind individual stock momentum? 
3. Will the combination of value and momentum improve portfolio performance and 
reduce the risk of crashes? 
To the best of found knowledge, the Nordic stock market is unexplored regarding industry 
effects as a possible explanation for the momentum in stock returns. Additionally, the Nordics 
is a somewhat unexplored area within factor investing in general and, especially, multi-factor 
investing. Consequently, this thesis contributes to existing research by expanding the explored 
universe of industry momentum, introduce new strategies, and offer new insights on the topic. 
Furthermore, I challenge the notion that industry effects drive the momentum in stock returns.  
The analysis is kept as simple as possible to avoid any data-mining issues. Only strategies that 
are implementable in real life are considered, meaning liquidity and short-selling opportunities 
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will be discussed, although superficial. As the market analyzed differs from that of existing 
and comparable papers, the results will not be directly transferrable. However, I test the 
robustness of the results throughout the thesis by implementing the strategies on the U.S. stock 
market in addition to the Nordic. 
This thesis is relevant and potentially valuable for academics and practitioners operating within 
the Nordic stock market. The results challenge existing findings on the topic, broadening our 
understanding of the momentum anomaly. Academics can use these findings to evaluate 
existing theoretical models further, and the combination strategies are directly relevant to 
practitioners and an exciting area of new research.  
First, I study the individual stock momentum strategy by creating zero-cost winner-minus-loser 
(WML) portfolios per Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) for the Nordic region. The strategy with a 
12-month formation period and 1-month holding period (12-1) yields a monthly mean excess 
return of 1.61% and a Sharpe ratio of 0.82, and is robust to traditional risk factors, with a three-
factor alpha of 2.47% and a t-statistic of 8.29. In conclusion, the momentum effect is present 
and highly significant in the Nordic stock market. 
Next, I explore industry effects as an explanation for the momentum observed in Nordic stock 
returns. Industry portfolios are created following the methodology of Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999) but adjusted based on sample limitations and crucial findings by Asness, Porter, and 
Stevens (2000). As the available data in the Nordics is a lot thinner than in the United States, 
stocks can only be allocated to 11 sectors, compared to 20 industries in Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt and 48 industries in Asness et al. The difference in industry classification system 
decrease the comparability to earlier studies. I identify a strong industry momentum effect in 
the Nordic stock market. However, no evidence is found for the said effect being the main 
driver behind individual stock momentum. When controlling for industry momentum, the alpha 
of individual stock momentum remains high and significant. Furthermore, the momentum 
effect is still present within industries, although slightly weaker, indicating that industry effects 
can only offer a partial explanation, at best. When conducting the same analysis on the U.S. 
sample, it yields the opposite results, consistent with the findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999), which may indicate that country-specific effects drive the results. 
As individual stock momentum in the Nordics is not driven by industry effects, thus not being 
as poorly diversified as initially thought, I must look elsewhere for rational explanations. 
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Consequently, I turn to the existence of momentum crashes. A severe crash for both industry- 
and individual stock momentum is observed over the sample period, indicating the presence of 
actual risks related to momentum investing. Furthermore, when looking the U.S. momentum 
strategy, the crash is even worse, indicating that these crashes are generally related to 
momentum investing, and not sample-specific effects. 
Consequently, to mitigate the risk of crashes and deal with possible diversification issues, I 
explore the benefits of combining momentum and value. These strategies are found to be 
negatively correlated by 0.50 in the Nordics, similar to the U.S. and European findings of 
Asness et al. (2013), which makes a combination potentially attractive. Two combinations of 
momentum and value are created: a weighted combination inspired by Asness et al. (2013) and 
a simultaneous selection inspired by Fisher, Shah, and Titman (2016). The weighted 
combination significantly increases risk-adjusted returns, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.27. 
Additionally, the value crash of 2000 and the momentum crash of 2009 is eliminated in their 
entirety. The simultaneous selection approach also increases risk-adjusted returns significantly 
with a Sharpe ratio of 1.20. Moreover, this method also increases raw excess returns compared 
to the momentum strategy, making this the most profitable strategy in this thesis. Interestingly, 
the abnormal returns are found to be almost entirely produced by the short portfolio. As the 
original article of Fisher et al. (2016) looks at long-only strategies, these findings contribute 
with new insights.  
In summary, I complement existing literature by challenging the findings of Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999). The results suggest a strong momentum effect in the Nordic stock market, 
not explained by industries. In fact, I find the industry effects to be minor, and explanations 
must be sought elsewhere. Additionally, I find momentum crashes to be eliminated entirely 
when combining momentum with a traditional value strategy. The weighted combination 
increases risk-adjusted returns while only losing some profitability compared to momentum 
alone. The simultaneous selection approach increases both raw- and risk-adjusted returns while 
mitigating the risk of crashes, and, consequently, pose as a puzzle to explain. 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter two covers relevant existing literature. Chapter 
three outlines the construction of the data set and presents the methodology and results of the 
momentum strategy. Chapter four explores industry momentum as the main driver behind 
momentum in Nordic stock returns. Chapter five presents the methodology and results of the 
combined strategies, and the thesis concludes in chapter six.   
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2. Literature Review 
The momentum effect is one of the most thoroughly researched anomalies in academic finance, 
and even though factor investing is a relatively new phenomenon outside academia, momentum 
is already well-known and -utilized. In short, momentum investing is buying companies with 
high historical returns (winners) (traditionally looking at periods between 6 and 12 months) 
and selling companies with poor past performance (losers), resulting in a winner-minus-loser 
(WML) strategy (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993).  
The momentum effect was first discovered by Levy (1967). Although the term momentum 
remained unspoken, he identified superior returns in securities that had performed well 
historically relative to peers2. Furthermore, he explained the effect with risk, thus, not rejecting 
the random walk hypothesis of Fama (1965). The findings of Levy were later discarded by 
Jensen and Benington (1970) on the basis of selection bias. Following this, research on the 
momentum anomaly laid dormant as a result of the development of the well-known efficient 
market hypothesis and contrarian strategies proposed by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). The 
latter is the absolute opposite of the momentum strategy we are familiar with today, with the 
hypothesis that a strategy that buys past losers and sells past winners yield abnormal returns 
because of stock price overreaction. 
The belief that security markets are efficient, meaning securities traded in the public market 
reflect all available information, was long the prevailing theory among academic economists. 
Fama (1970) found the evidence supporting the efficient markets model to be extensive and 
the contradictory evidence to be somewhat sparse. However, he emphasized that the matter is 
not closed, and many areas of research remained to be explored. This hypothesis, being true, 
would mean that there is no way for investors to achieve abnormal returns, and securities prices 
move in a random walk3. The idea behind random walk is that price changes in securities 
represent random departures from previous prices; thus, neither technical analysis, where 
investors use past prices to predict future prices nor fundamental analysis, where investors try 
to find undervalued companies, would achieve abnormal returns (Malkiel, 2003).  
 
2 The relativity of the performance is key, as the winning companies (the highest past performers) can still have 
negative returns as long as they outperform the other companies. 
3 The random walk term was popularized by Malkiel in 1973 when he published his well-known book, A Random 
Walk Down Wall Street. 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) continue the work of Levy and find a WML strategy to yield 
abnormal returns, thus challenging both the efficient market hypothesis and the contrarian 
strategy proposed by De Bondt et al. The most thoroughly examined strategy, which selects 
stocks based on their past six-month returns and holds them for another six months, returned 
an annual average of 12.01%. Moreover, they find the returns to be positive in the first 12 
months after the formation period, except for the first, while more extended periods reduce the 
strategy’s profitability. They explain their findings with either market underreaction or WML-
traders moving prices away from their long-run values, hence, overreaction.  
Although the findings of Jegadeesh et al. have been well accepted, the explanations for the 
anomaly remain a widely debated topic. Most literature argues that the momentum effect is 
evidence of market inefficiencies and explain the anomaly with behavioral bias such as 
underreaction and investor overconfidence, herding, and anchoring-effects (Barberis, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong & Stein, 1999). Others 
believe in rational explanations and argue that the profitability of such a strategy is explained 
with increased risk or even data mining. Fama and French (1992), Conrad and Kaul (1998), 
and Asness (1997) point out that momentum is stronger among companies with considerable 
growth potential and risky cash flows. These companies then run the risk of said growth and 
cash flow not materializing. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) discuss the different explanations, 
test the strategy out-of-sample, and find the evidence for the profitability of the momentum 
strategy to be highly robust and not a result of data mining. However, they emphasize that their 
results should be tempered with caution, as momentum profits sometimes are associated with 
reversals in the post-holding period and that behavioral models can only provide a partial 
explanation for the anomaly, at best. 
Although there is little doubt regarding the theoretical profitability of a momentum strategy, 
many researchers point out the high turnover and that accounting for transaction costs will 
drastically reduce abnormal returns. Motivated by this, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) 
explore industry momentum as the main driver behind the momentum effect. If industry effects 
explain the momentum in stock returns, industry momentum poses a more profitable and 
implementable strategy due to its lower turnover. They find a strong industry momentum effect 
in the United States, which does not appear to be explained by either individual stock 
momentum, microstructure effects, or cross-sectional dispersion in mean returns. Furthermore, 
the industry momentum effect seems to contribute substantially to the profitability of individual 
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stock momentum and, except for the 12-month strategy, captures these effects almost entirely. 
They also find industry momentum trading strategies to be more profitable and implementable 
and generate as much or more profits from the long portfolio as the short portfolio. In contrast, 
the individual stock momentum profits are mainly generated from the short positions. 
Moreover, industry momentum remains strong for even the largest and most liquid stocks.  
These findings suggest that an individual stock momentum strategy is not very well diversified, 
as the past winners and losers tend to be in the same industries, and they are more likely to be 
more highly correlated. As a result, the portfolios have higher idiosyncratic risk, and rational 
investors will limit their position in such a portfolio, hence, worsening (or at least not 
contributing to removing) the mispricing in these companies. This builds on the notion that 
there is some risk related to individual stock momentum investing, which either makes 
investors demand a higher return or prolongs the mispricing, as the strategy may be deemed 
sub-optimal to rational investors.  
The work of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) was subject to criticism in the succeeding years. 
Asness et al. (2000) concludes differently and point out two crucial differences in methodology 
that may explain the results. First, Moskowitz and Grinblatt use two-digit SIC codes yielding 
20 industries compared to 48 in Asness et al. They argue that this methodology enables widely 
different companies to be included in the same industry. Second, they point out the importance 
of the one-month gap between the formation and holding period to avoid market-microstructure 
issues. Additionally, Grundy and Martin (2001) find the conclusions of Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt to be premature, although they conclude with industry effects having some impact on 
the existence of momentum in stock returns. This thesis contributes to the literature on industry 
momentum by exploring the phenomenon out-of-sample, both in a new market and over a new 
sample period. 
Another possible risk associated with individual stock momentum is momentum crashes. 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) highlight two examples of such crashes in the U.S. equity 
market, the first being during the summer of 1932, where the past-loser portfolio returned 
232%, and the past-winner portfolio returned only 32%, and the second being during the 
financial crisis, where the past losers rose by 163% and the past winners returned only 8%. 
They find the crashes to be fairly predictable, often occurring after more prolonged market 
downturns. They explain the phenomenon with the momentum strategy being long low-beta 
stocks that is likely to have performed better relative to the market during downturns and short 
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high-beta stocks that have suffered the most. When the market recoils, the high-beta stocks are 
likely to perform better, resulting in a significant loss for the short portfolio. The momentum 
returns are negatively skewed, and rational investors are rewarded for carrying this risk. 
Another related risk-based explanation, proposed by Liu and Zhang (2008), is that past high 
performers are more prone to worsening outlooks, thus being punished more in bear markets 
relative to peers. In order to reduce the crash risk of the momentum strategy, Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016) propose a volatility-managed strategy that significantly reduced the 
drawdowns and almost doubling the Sharpe ratio. By using bear market indicators and ex-ante 
volatility estimates, they create a dynamically weighted momentum strategy that significantly 
improves the plain momentum strategy in all studied markets, periods, and asset classes.  
This thesis explores another way to reduce the damage from momentum crashes by introducing 
the value factor into the strategy. Benjamin Graham and David Dodd are by many thought of 
as the founders of the value investing strategy. Their book from 1934, Security Analysis, laid 
the foundation for value investors worldwide and introduced the term margin of safety, a term 
later used in Graham’s very famous book from 1949, The Intelligent Investor. Their idea was 
to invest with a margin of safety, meaning that for them to invest, the price paid in the market 
must be lower than the intrinsic value of the stock (Graham, 2003). In order to quantify the 
value effect, plentiful research has identified several factors which purpose is to separate the 
cheap companies from the expensive.  
In one of the most heavily quoted papers in academic finance, Fama and French (1992) identify 
the value premium and introduce the high-minus-low factor (HML). They find company size 
and the book-to-market equity ratio to have a substantial role in predicting average returns. 
Their results indicate that between 1963 and 1990, these two factors perform best in explaining 
the cross-section of expected stock returns in the United States, and when accounted for, the 
beta (𝛽) of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) loses its importance. However, this study 
looks at data from 1963 – 1990, which might not give the correct image, as value and growth 
cycles stretch over long periods. Petkova and Zhang (2005) analyze a more extended sample 
period and report an even higher growth to value spread, strengthening the probability of such 
an effect.  
Extending this research further, Fama and French (1998) identify a significant value premium 
internationally between 1975 and 1995. More specifically, the value premium measured 
through equity book-to-market ratio is present in 12 out of 13 studied markets. They find the 
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difference in returns between value and growth stocks to be 7.68% annually (t-statistic of 3.45) 
and test with other value measures, like earnings/price, cash flow/price, and dividend/price, all 
returning similar results. They explain the effect rationally with high book-to-market ratio 
companies having poor earning and growth prospects and, consequently, being undervalued in 
the market. Conversely, low book-to-market companies have high earning prospects and are 
therefore rewarded in the market. This explanation is similar to that of Fama and French (1992), 
where they argue that the book-to-market ratio captures financial distress (risk).  
Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) analyze the momentum- and value premium in 
several markets and across asset classes and identify the anomalies in all explored markets and 
assets. Furthermore, they find the correlation of value and momentum to be -0.53 in U.S. 
equities and continue to explore the possibility of combining value and momentum in a 
weighted portfolio. As momentum and value strategies are negatively correlated, a combination 
of these is expected to be closer to the efficient frontier than each one individually. For U.S. 
stocks, the value strategy yields an annual return of 3.7% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.29, and the 
momentum strategy yields an annual return of 5.4% with a Sharpe ratio of 0.33. Subsequently, 
they create a 50/50 value/momentum portfolio, and even though the annual return is 4.6%, 
which is less than the momentum portfolio alone, the risk-adjusted returns have increased 
significantly, with a Sharpe ratio of 0.63. Their results indicate that a combination increases 
risk-adjusted returns.  
In addition to the strategy used by Asness et al. (2013), other, more sophisticated strategies 
have been explored in recent years. Fisher et al. (2016) study the U.S. stock market from 1975 
through 2013 and find that a strategy that simultaneously incorporates value and momentum in 
a long-only portfolio outperforms the simple weighted strategy proposed by Asness et al. 
(2013) while also achieving a higher Sharpe ratio than the market. Their study is on long-only 
strategies and takes transaction costs into account and is therefore not directly comparable to 
studies on zero-cost strategies. As a contribution to existing research, I explore the proposed 
strategy of Fisher et al. (2016) as a zero-cost strategy in the Nordic stock market.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by expanding the research on industry effects 
as a driver for individual momentum. Furthermore, value is explored as a risk-mitigator, and a 
previously proposed long-only strategy is implemented as a zero-cost strategy. Lastly, the 
sample period includes a new crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic.  
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3. Individual Stock Momentum 
A momentum strategy selects stocks based on past returns, creating a portfolio that is long the 
best-performing stocks (winners) and short the worst-performing stocks (losers). The short 
position finances the long positions, resulting in a zero-cost portfolio. The Nordic individual 
stock momentum strategy is studied following the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), with some key changes motivated by Asness et al. (2013) and Novy-Marx (2012). The 
following chapters include the construction of the data material, the methodology behind the 
individual stock momentum strategy, and the results.  
3.1 Data 
The sample runs from January 31st, 1989 to January 31st, 2021, and contains listed companies 
traded in ordinary shares at Nordic stock exchanges. Monthly stock prices, accounting data, 
and industries are downloaded from DataStream. Data on interest rates are downloaded from 
multiple sources, as no single source covers the entire period, but Statistics Norway is the most 
significant contributor. 
The Nordic stock universe includes Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), OMX Nordic Exchange 
Copenhagen (CSE), Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE), and 
Iceland Stock Exchange (ICE). Iceland is excluded, as there is not enough available data in the 
required period.  
DataStream offers data before January 1989, but sample size issues, especially in Denmark and 
Finland, restricts earlier analysis. Consequently, the sample period covers 33 years, comparable 
to previous research on this topic. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999), and Asness et al. (2013) use data over 24, 32, and 39 years, respectively. 
Existing literature on this topic is mainly centered around the United States or Europe. The 
Nordic region is a somewhat undiscovered area and makes for some of the originality of the 
thesis. To the best of found knowledge, industry momentum alone has never been analyzed in 
the Nordics, and the thesis will contribute to a deeper understanding of the subject.  
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The dataset comprises month-end adjusted close prices4, market values (MV), and annual book 
values of all companies in the universe stated above5. These data are necessary to create both 
value and momentum portfolios. Furthermore, the companies are sorted into industry directly 
in DataStream, based on the industry classification system in all four markets6, which results 
in 12 industries in total. As over 30% of the stocks lack industry classification, these are entered 
manually following the classification in Eikon. Academic & Educational Services only consist 
of one company (Academedia from Sweden) and is changed to Consumer Cyclicals as per 
Bloomberg. Thus, 11 industries remain. 
Companies with no observations on one or more variables are removed from the data set, as 
these are unusable in the analysis. Delisted stocks are given NA values after the date of 
delisting. Both A and B shares are included in the sample, as these are both tradable companies. 
They will, however, increase the correlation between company returns.  
The market index is constructed by value-weighting every company in the sample (the Nordics) 
in a single portfolio. In order to sort the stocks on size, market values are converted into EUR, 
as this is the only currency that covers the entire period. The returns are calculated in excess of 
the risk-free rate (Nibor 3-month). Inspired by Asness et al. (2013), every month, the smallest 
50% of stocks are removed from the sample to ensure low transaction costs and liquidity, thus 
making the investible universe more practically feasible. Moreover, the accounting variable 
(book value) at fiscal year-end t - 1 is lagged six months, aligning with month-end June in 
year t, to ensure data availability following Fama and French (1992). Factor returns for the 
market, size, and value used in regression analysis are created for the Nordic stock market 
following the methodology of Fama and French (1993, 2015).  
The finished sample consists of 138 034 observations divided between a total of 1104 
companies. The minimum market value for inclusion was EUR 37.34 million in the last month 
of 1989 and EUR 77.77 million in January 2021. The sample consists of almost the entire 
market measured in market capitalization, even when removing 50% of the companies.  
 
4 Stock prices adjusted for dividends, stock splits, and rights offerings.  
5 DataStream variable codes: Adjusted Prices (P#T), Market Value (MV), and Book Value (WC03501).  
6 Industry classification system: Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC). Consists of 4 levels, and the 




At the beginning of each month t, the stocks are ranked in descending order based on their 
cumulative raw return over the past F months, skipping the most recent month to avoid short-
term reversals7 (Asness, Moskowitz, & Pedersen, 2013). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
experimented with no gap and a week-long gap in their article, but a one-month gap is today’s 





− 1  (1) 
F is the entire formation period, e.g., an F of 12 means I want to look at the last 12 months 
return, skipping the most recent month to decide our longs and shorts for the coming holding 
period H. Only stocks with return data over the entire period are included. Based on their 
ranking, ten decile portfolios are created that equally weigh each decile's stocks, as per 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Asness et al. (2013) value-weighted their portfolios in order to 
capture some of the size effect, but as the Nordic stock market at times consists of companies 
with a highly dominating size, the results would be skewed. Furthermore, as only the 50% 
largest companies in the Nordics are included every month, the results will capture some size 
effect. Further adjustments regarding transaction- and financing costs are left out of the 
quantitative analysis but will be discussed when applicable. 
The top decile is called the winners, and the bottom decile is called the losers. In each month t, 
the strategy buys the winning decile and sells the losing decile, holding the positions 
for H months. The strategy also closes out the position initiated in month t - H. Several 
different holding periods are explored, more specifically 1, 3, and 6 months, but the focus 
remains on the 12-month formation, 1-month holding strategy motivated by the findings of 
Novy-Marx (2012).  
Inspired by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the strategies examined include portfolios with 
overlapping holding periods. In any given month t, the strategies hold a series of portfolios 
created in month t as well as in the previous H-1 months. If the holding period is one month, 
then the strategy never has overlapping holding periods as the previous position is closed out 
 
7 A stock’s tendency to respond negatively (positively) to the previous week’s/month’s positive (negative) return. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) tested strategies both without a gap and with a 1-week gap in their article. New 
research suggests a 1-month gap is preferable (Asness, Moskowitz, & Pedersen, 2013). 
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as the new position is initiated. Below is a visualization of one of the momentum strategies, 
with a six-month formation and one-month holding period. 
Figure 1: Momentum portfolio construction 
Figure 1 is a visual overview of four momentum portfolios and their creation. The Figure illustrates portfolios 
created using a formation period of six months and holding of one month. The first investment is made in January 
(t), using the price history of the preceding six (t-6), skipping the last (t-1), giving us 5 month of return data as 




To compare profitability, risk, and significance of the different strategies, a set of standard 
figures are calculated for every created portfolio: the mean returns in excess of the risk-free 
rate (NIBOR 3-month), compound monthly growth rate (CMGR), annualized Sharpe ratio, 
alphas from the CAPM and the three-factor model, and maximum drawdown during the sample 
period. The mean return is calculated as the average monthly return. The cumulative monthly 
growth rate (CMGR) is calculated using the formula below: 
 𝐶𝑀𝐺𝑅𝑠 = (1 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑠)
1
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 − 1 (2) 
Where 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑠  stands for Holding Period Return. To measure the strategy’s risk-adjusted 
returns, the annualized Sharpe ratio is calculated for each strategy. This is done by dividing the 
average annual returns in excess of the risk-free rate by the annualized volatility: 




Furthermore, alphas from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the three-factor model 
of Fama and French (1993) are reported. The formula for CAPM is: 





The formula for the three-factor model is: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (5) 
No factors are publicly available for the Nordic stock market in total. Consequently, these are 
constructed based on the methodology of Fama and French (1993). The SMB-factor is 









(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) 
(6) 









+ 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) 
(7) 
In short, I sort the stocks on size, allocating the 50% largest companies measured in market 
value into the big group and the other 50% into the small group. Next, within each size group, 
the stocks are ranked based on their book-to-market ratio, allocating the top 30% (the 30% 
highest book-to-market ratio’s) in the value group, the bottom 30% in the growth group, and 
the 40% in between to the neutral group. For further information, see the website of Kenneth 
French and Fama and French (1993). They have not created any factors for the Nordics, but 
they do have a comparable dataset for Europe as a whole. This dataset is downloaded from 
Kenneth French’s website8 to compare with my results. Understandably, some differences are 
found, but the results are comparable, indicating a successful replication of the risk factors. 
3.3 Results 
Table 1 presents the winning decile, losing decile, and winner-minus-loser strategy excess 
returns over different formation- and holding periods. The WML returns are high and 
significant in all tested periods, but as expected, the 12-month formation and 1-month holding 
strategy yield the highest returns, as well as the highest Sharpe ratio. Generally, the strategies 
with the shortest holding periods perform relatively better, consistent with the results of 
 
8 The website of Kenneth French: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. The 
monthly Fama/French European 3 Factors are used to validate the results.  
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 Table 1: Individual stock momentum strategy results 
Reported are the mean returns in excess of the risk-free rate (NIBOR 3-month), compound monthly growth rate (CMGR), annualized Sharpe ratio and alphas from CAPM and 
the three-factor model of Fama and French. The mean return is calculated as the average monthly return. The CMGR is calculated as 1 + HPR raised to the power of 1 divided 
by number of months (373) ((1 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅)
1
373 − 1). The annualized Sharpe ratio is calculated as the mean return in excess of the risk-free rate divided by the annualized volatility. 
T-statistics are reported in parathesis. The table reports the results for the momentum strategy; the winning portfolio (top decile), the losing portfolio (bottom decile) and the 






Holding 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6
Mean R (%) 1,34 1,15 1,16 1,52 1,32 1,11 0,13 0,19 0,28 -0,08 0,04 0,33 1,21 0,97 0,88 1,61 1,28 0,78
(4,05) (3,61) (3,72) (4,77) (4,23) (3,53) (0,30) (0,45) (0,68) (-0,20) (0,10) (0,79) (3,78) (3,31) (3,36) (4,57) (3,94) (2,51)
CMGR (%) 1,13 0,95 0,96 1,32 1,13 0,91 -0,23 -0,14 -0,04 -0,46 -0,30 0,00 1,02 0,80 0,74 1,36 1,07 0,59
Sharpe ratio 0,73 0,65 0,67 0,86 0,76 0,63 0,05 0,08 0,12 -0,03 0,02 0,14 0,68 0,59 0,60 0,82 0,71 0,45
CAPM-alpha 0,41 0,23 0,34 0,63 0,43 0,20 -1,07 -0,98 -0,89 -1,27 -1,10 -0,79 1,49 1,21 1,12 1,90 1,53 0,99
(2,07) (1,27) (1,42) (3,25) (2,35) (1,11) (-4,12) (-3,93) (-3,73) (-4,32) (-3,93) (-2,92) (4,69) (4,19) (4,37) (5,45) (4,71) (3,16)
3-factor alpha 0,28 0,11 0,13 0,57 0,38 0,16 -1,58 -1,49 -1,39 -1,90 -1,70 -1,37 1,86 1,60 1,53 2,47 2,07 1,52
(1,39) (0,60) (0,78) (2,93) (2,05) (0,87) (-7,47) (-7,37) (-7,26) (-8,18) (-7,67) (-6,41) (6,60) (6,18) (6,73) (8,29) (7,53) (5,76)
MKT 0,98 0,96 0,95 0,91 0,91 0,92 1,31 1,28 1,29 1,32 1,28 1,25 -0,33 -0,32 -0,34 -0,42 -0,37 -0,32
(25,93) (27,53) (29,53) (24,57) (26,18) (27,08) (32,63) (33,43) (35,37) (30,11) (30,51) (30,92) (-6,18) (-6,51) (-7,85) (-7,34) (-7,00) (-6,47)
SMB 0,44 0,36 0,29 0,21 0,19 0,16 0,79 0,83 0,87 1,02 0,96 0,93 -0,34 -0,47 -0,58 -0,81 -0,77 -0,76
(4,18) (3,61) (3,14) (2,02) (1,91) (1,70) (6,91) (7,64) (8,40) (8,19) (8,07) (8,10) (-2,24) (-3,40) (-4,76) (-5,06) (-5,20) (-5,37)
HML -0,07 -0,18 0,01 -0,07 -0,06 -0,06 0,70 0,65 0,60 0,81 0,77 0,74 -0,77 -0,67 -0,60 -0,88 -0,83 -0,80
(-1,44) (-0,38) (0,15) (-1,45) (-1,26) (-1,26) (12,89) (12,57) (12,26) (13,53) (13,57) (13,62) (-10,72) (-10,08) (-10,26) (-11,48) (-11,73) (-11,83)










Zero-Cost (Winner - Losers)Losers
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Additionally, the short positions contribute significantly to the 
abnormal returns, especially for the 12-1 strategy. Although size is accounted for by removing 
the smallest companies in the sample, this still makes the strategy harder to implement in 
practice, as short-selling is subject to illiquidity issues and potentially high costs. Furthermore, 
most of the profitability of the individual momentum strategy is driven by outliers, as using 
10% breakpoints is drastically more profitable than, for example, 30%.  
As seen in Table 1, all the zero-cost strategies are highly profitable and significant over the 
sample period. However, Figure 2 shows that the individual momentum strategy suffers from 
a severe crash when the market recoils after the financial crisis of 2008. This confirms that the 
momentum crashes explored and explained in Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) are present in the 
Nordic market. 
Figure 2: 12-1 momentum strategy returns 
The left graph shows the cumulative return of the WML 12-1 strategy. As we can see, the strategy suffers from a 
severe crash around 2009. The graph on the right shows the long and short portfolio and the reason for said crash 
is visualized. The short-portfolio experiences a strong recoil after the financial crisis, much because the loser 
stocks from the previous downturn are high-beta stocks. 
 
The factor loadings are negative for all zero-cost WML strategies. The momentum strategy is 
betting on low beta, big and low book-to-market stocks. Moreover, although the HML-loadings 
are all significantly negative, the difference in loadings for the different strategies indicates that 
using shorter formation periods and longer holding periods might increase the exposure to 
value stocks. Furthermore, the maximum drawdowns for the strategies with shorter formation 
periods are overall lower. This might indicate that higher positive exposure to value stocks 




When focusing on the factor loadings of the long and short portfolios, it is easier to understand 
the drivers behind the strategy's profitability. The three-factor alpha of the long portfolio is 
positive and statistically significant, meaning that the portfolio outperforms the market, 
although it follows the market to a large degree with a beta of 0.91. Furthermore, the long 
portfolio is relatively neutral regarding SMB, although it seems that the portfolio is slightly 
more exposed to small stocks. Moreover, the HML-loading is statistically insignificant and 
close to zero, meaning it is exposed to a varied mixture of stocks with both value and growth 
characteristics. The three-factor alpha of the short portfolio is negative and highly significant. 
This portfolio seems to be betting on high beta, small and high book-to-market ratio stocks, 
although these risk factors do not come close in explaining all of the returns.  
To test these findings out-of-sample, I download ten equally-weighted decile portfolios from 
Kenneth French's website. The sorting follows this thesis' methodology perfectly. For 
visualization and a table of the results, see appendix 1. The individual stock momentum effect 
is much weaker in the United States throughout the period. In fact, the raw excess return of the 
U.S. WML strategy is insignificant at the 5% level. Controlling for the U.S. excess market 
return and U.S. risk factors, the three-factor alpha is reported at 0.75% and barely significant 
with a t-statistic of 2.02. The factor loadings are all negative, consistent with the findings in 
the Nordics. Furthermore, the U.S. momentum strategy returned a negative 82.5% just after the 
financial crisis, far worse than in the Nordic stock market. These deviations in results may 
result from more investors trying to exploit the momentum effect in the United States, thus 
reducing the strategy's profitability.  
In conclusion, the momentum effect is present and highly significant in the Nordics. The 12-1 
strategy yields the highest and most significant returns, even after controlling for the market, 
size, and book-to-market ratio. The annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.82 is very impressive and 
makes the strategy attractive for investors. However, the strategy experiences a severe crash in 
the wake of the financial crisis, as the short portfolio outperforms during the recoil. Risk-averse 
investors will limit their exposure to such a portfolio. Furthermore, the Nordic stock market is 
more attractive than the U.S. stock market for a momentum investor. This finding is explained 
by fewer investors exploiting the momentum effect in the Nordics, thus not improving the 
mispricing in these stocks.  
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4. Industry Momentum 
As discussed in chapter two, the explanation for individual stock momentum is a widely 
discussed topic. Overall, there are two main models: behavioral and rational. In this chapter, 
industry effects are pursued as the main contributor to the momentum observed in Nordic stock 
returns. If this is the case, the individual stock momentum strategy aggressively takes on 
positions within the same industry, making it poorly diversified, thus offering a rational 
explanation. 
As established in the previous chapter, the individual stock momentum strategy is highly 
profitable and yields significant abnormal returns in the Nordics. This chapter will explore 
whether this profitability can be attributed to industry effects. I primarily follow the 
methodology of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), and deviations will be explained thoroughly. 
Asness et al. (2000) are critical of the methodology and findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt. 
I explore the methodological differences throughout the chapter and the robustness of my 
results by implementing the WML industry strategy in a broader industry range in the United 
States.  
4.1 Methodology 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) explore the momentum effect on an industry level, and their 
results indicate that industry momentum explains much of the momentum profits over 
intermediate investment horizons (6 to 12 months) in the U.S. stock market. In more recent 
years, other academics have explored industry momentum but with a few methodological 
differences. Changes made to the methodology of Moskowitz and Grinblatt will be explained 
thoroughly. 
The Nordic stock market is much smaller than the U.S. stock market, meaning the sample 
consists of a drastically lower amount of investable stocks. Dividing the Nordic stock between 
48 different industries as in Grundy and Martin (2001) or 20 industries as in Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999) would make some industries dependent on very few companies. In order to 
keep the industries somewhat diversified, I use DataStream’s industry classification system, 
resulting in a total of 12 industries. However, this is reduced to 11 due to size issues 
for Academic & Educational Services, as explained in chapter three. 
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Next, I consider whether I should value- or equal-weight the stocks within each industry. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) use a value-weighted approach for the U.S. data in their article 
and explain the decision with conveniency for further analysis. The advantage of value-
weighting the industries is that bigger stocks are often more liquid and subject to lower 
transaction costs, making them more feasible. However, as the sample only consists of the 50% 
biggest companies measured in market capitalization, only fairly liquid and shortable 
companies remain. Furthermore, as the number of stocks in the Nordics are substantially lower, 
a value-weighted approach would drastically affect the results. Consequently, I choose an 
equal-weight approach to avoid skewed results by a few large companies. Additionally, the 
equal-weighted industries make the results directly comparable to the individual stock 
momentum strategy in chapter 3, which is vital in this thesis. Furthermore, equal weighting the 
portfolios is also more realistic for professional investors, as funds using strategies exploiting 
these anomalies are actively managed and do not value-weight their positions9. 
Following the methodology of Moskowitz & Grinblatt (1999), I construct self-financing (zero-
cost) winner minus loser portfolios, similar to the individual stock momentum strategy in 
chapter three. The industry portfolios are sorted based on their past six- or twelve-month return 
and the strategy invest in the top-performing industry while shorting equally the worst-
performing industry. The holding period is one, three, and six months, the same as in both 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999).  
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) focus primarily on the 6-month formation and 6-month 
holding strategy (6-6), where they rank the value-weighted industries (a total of 20 industries) 
based on the returns in the 6-month formation period (t-6 to t-1) and buy the highest six 
performing industries and sell the lowest six industries, holding this position for six months 
(t to t+5). Compared to this, two adjustments are made to the methodology. First, I use deciles 
instead of 30% breakpoints, making the findings comparable to the individual stock momentum 
strategy in chapter three, and second, I use a 1-month gap between the end of formation and 
start of investing/holding.  
Industry momentum is said to disappear when a one-month interval is used between the 
formation and holding period. Consequently, the profitability of industry momentum is highly 
correlated with the month immediately after the formation period (Grundy & Martin, 2001). 
 
9 E.g., an actively managed fund focusing solely on the Norwegian stock market would not value-weigh their 
portfolio, as this would mean having a massive stake in, for example Equinor, and therefore not be diversified. 
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The effect of the interval in the Nordic stock market is tested by creating value-weighted 6-6 
industry momentum strategies with and without the 1-month interval between the formation 
and holding period. No significant differences were identified. The strategy with a 1-month 
gap was just barely less profitable (CAGR of 4.44% compared to 4.75%) and significant (p-
value of 0.09 against 0.08). The sample-specific differences must be emphasized, and a 
somewhat different result is expected. However, these results indicate that whether or not I use 
a 1-month gap is not decisive for the conclusions. 
4.2 Results 
Table 2 present the results of the industry momentum strategy. The strategies yield high and 
significant returns, both measured in raw excess returns and alphas. Compared to individual 
stock momentum, the three-factor alphas are on average lower for industry momentum, albeit 
weakly so, meaning that the traditional risk factors work better in explaining the returns of 
industry momentum. Still, the strategies seem more robust to changes in both formation and 
holding period. As for factor loadings, MKT and SMB are statistically insignificant. This 
means that the industry momentum strategy on average is neutral to the market and bets on 
average-sized companies. These results make sense, as the industries include a more diversified 
set of companies of different sizes. The HML-factor is still negatively loaded, as expected, 
driven by the short portfolio, which is positively exposed to value stocks. One of the key 
findings in the original article was the improved profitability of the industry momentum 
strategy compared to the individual stock momentum strategy. This finding is not evident in 
the Nordic stock market, looking at the best performing strategy in Tables 1 and 2. However, 
as previously mentioned, the industry momentum strategy is more robust to changes in the 
formation- and holding period, making other strategy variations more profitable than for 
individual stock momentum measured in raw excess returns. 
Figure 3 visualizes the cumulative returns of the 12-1 long, short, and zero-cost portfolio. 
Compared to individual stock momentum, the industry WML strategy seems to generate more 
profits from the long positions. These findings are similar to that of Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999), who find industry momentum in the United States to be generated from both long- and 
short positions, not mainly short-positions like with individual stock momentum. This makes 
the industry momentum strategy more implementable. Furthermore, looking at the 12-1 
strategy only, the raw excess returns for industry momentum are similar to that of individual 
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Table 2: Industry momentum strategy results 
Reported are the mean returns in excess of the risk-free rate (NIBOR 3-month), compound monthly growth rate (CMGR), annualized Sharpe ratio and alphas from CAPM and 
the three-factor model. The mean return is calculated as the average monthly return. The CMGR is calculated as 1 + HPR raised to the power of 1 divided by number of months 
(373) ((1 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅)
1
373 − 1). The annualized Sharpe ratio is calculated as the mean return in excess of the risk-free rate divided by the annualized volatility. T-statistics is 
reported in parathesis. The table reports the results for the industry momentum strategy; the winning portfolio (top decile), the losing portfolio (bottom decile) and the zero-
cost (winners minus losers) portfolio over 6 and 12 month formation periods and 1, 3, and 6 month holding periods.  
Portfolio
Formation
Holding 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6
Mean R (%) 1,65 1,65 1,49 1,84 1,65 1,51 0,21 0,22 0,33 0,30 0,36 0,39 1,44 1,43 1,16 1,54 1,29 1,12
(3,94) (4,22) (4,06) (4,48) (4,05) (3,73) (0,49) (0,58) (0,85) (0,68) (0,87) (0,98) (3,27) (3,93) (3,71) (3,55) (3,34) (3,14)
CMGR (%) 1,29 1,33 1,21 1,48 1,30 1,16 -0,14 -0,07 0,04 -0,07 0,03 0,08 1,04 1,15 0,96 1,15 0,98 0,85
Sharpe ratio 0,71 0,76 0,73 0,80 0,73 0,67 0,09 0,10 0,15 0,12 0,16 0,18 0,59 0,70 0,67 0,64 0,60 0,56
CAPM-alpha 0,63 0,67 0,53 0,86 0,62 0,45 -0,75 -0,71 -0,68 -0,76 -0,67 -0,63 1,38 1,38 1,21 1,62 1,29 1,08
(2,07) (2,41) (2,15) (2,80) (2,17) (1,65) (-2,20) (-2,53) (-2,65) (-2,33) (-2,30) (-2,33) (3,11) (3,72) (3,80) (3,68) (3,30) (2,98)
3-factor alpha 0,41 0,43 0,31 0,66 0,41 0,24 -1,08 -1,07 -1,08 -1,20 -1,11 -1,05 1,49 1,50 1,39 1,86 1,52 1,29
(1,36) (1,55) (1,26) (2,16) (1,45) (0,90) (-3,26) (-3,99) (-4,54) (-3,87) (-4,05) (-4,21) (3,42) (4,08) (4,80) (4,31) (3,96) (3,71)
MKT 1,12 1,08 1,03 1,07 1,11 1,15 1,02 1,01 1,10 1,16 1,14 1,12 0,09 0,06 -0,08 -0,10 -0,27 0,03
(19,21) (20,66) (21,93) (18,27) (20,57) (22,62) (16,28) (19,98) (24,51) (19,84) (21,93) (23,64) (1,06) (0,88) (-1,30) (-1,22) (-0,37) (0,40)
SMB 0,74 0,68 0,56 0,67 0,65 0,69 0,45 0,58 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,72 0,29 0,10 -0,19 -0,09 -0,10 -0,03
(4,54) (4,58) (4,20) (4,03) (4,23) (4,80) (2,55) (4,00) (5,85) (4,51) (5,09) (5,34) (1,23) (0,52) (-1,11) (-0,36) (-0,49) (-0,15)
HML -0,14 -0,01 0,06 -0,13 -0,08 -0,13 0,51 0,56 0,41 0,52 0,50 0,49 -0,65 -0,47 -0,35 -0,65 -0,58 -0,63
(-1,77) (-0,20) (0,91) (-1,65) (-1,13) (0,05) (6,06) (6,69) (6,71) (6,52) (7,16) (7,70) (-5,82) (-5,04) (-4,32) (-5,85) (-5,93) (-7,02)
Max DD (%) 63,39 69,44 71,33 68,30 71,88 73,41 78,31 73,47 80,76 72,38 73,59 72,25 68,98 51,06 40,08 74,03 60,30 51,18
12
Winners Losers Zero-Cost (Winner - Losers)









stock momentum. However, the monthly three-factor alpha is 0.63 percentage points lower and 
less significant. This difference in three-factor alpha has roots in the performance of the short-
portfolio, confirming the previous statement. 
Figure 3: 12-1 industry momentum strategy returns 
The left graph shows the cumulative return of the WML 12-1 strategy. As we can see, the strategy suffers from a 
severe crash around 2009, same as for stock momentum. The graph on the right shows the long and short portfolio 
and the reason for said crash is visualized. The short-portfolio experiences a strong recoil after the financial crisis, 
much because the loser industry from the previous downturn experience a significant recoil. 
 
The industry momentum crash and the total drawdown from peak to bottom is severe. The 
maximum drawdown for the 12-1 strategy is around 75 %, far more than the market. From 
Figure 3, we can see that the long positions fell more than the short position during the financial 
crisis. In addition, the short position performed much better during the recoil, resulting in a 
massive loss for the industry WML strategy. 
As mentioned earlier, one exciting aspect of the industry momentum results is that the raw 
excess returns from different formation- and holding periods varies less for industries than for 
individual stocks. This finding may indicate that industry trends move over longer periods with 
fewer disruptions. Furthermore, outliers may not be as crucial as for individual stock 
momentum, as the 12-1 strategy is even more profitable and less risky when using 20% 
breakpoints. 
To test whether the identified industry momentum effect is present when using a broader 
industry range, I must use data from the United States due to size issues in the Nordic sample. 
I download industry returns from both 12 and 48 industries in the United States from Kenneth 
French’s website. When using the same methodology and period as for the Nordic sample, I 
find the U.S. industry momentum effect to be present, although slightly weaker than the Nordic 
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industry returns. See appendix 1 and 2 for results. The strategy using 12 industries yields a 
significant raw monthly excess return of 0.62% and a three-factor alpha of 0.86%. When using 
48 industries, the raw excess return is reported at 0.73% and the alpha at 0.88%. As we can 
see, the differences are minimal, and the findings are robust to industry classification in the 
United States. Furthermore, compared to the U.S. individual stock WML strategy, the industry 
momentum strategies are more profitable at less risk. This is opposite of the findings for the 
Nordic stock market but consistent with the findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999).  
To conclude: industry momentum is present, and an industry WML strategy is highly profitable 
and seems to be more robust to changes in both formation periods, holding periods, and 
breakpoints. Furthermore, the results seem robust to industry classification when looking at 
U.S. data. All this makes the strategy attractive to implement for investors. However, the risk-
adjusted returns are lower, the three-factor alpha of the 12-1 strategy is much lower, and the 
strategy suffers from severe drawdowns, worse than individual stock momentum. The 
difference might be explained by diversification issues, as companies within industries are 
more highly correlated than companies across industries, and the industry WML strategy is, 
for obvious reasons, more dependent on industries.  
4.3 Industry-Adjusted Momentum Profits 
In the previous subchapter, I found industry momentum to be present, profitable, and highly 
significant, even when accounting for traditional risk factors. However, some critical 
differences in results compared to Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) make it necessary for 
further testing to determine whether industry effects explain the momentum observed in Nordic 
stock returns. As a simple preliminary test, I explore whether the individual stock momentum 
identified in chapter three exists after accounting for industry momentum. In addition to the 
three risk factors in the model of Fama and French (1993), I introduce a fourth factor: industry 
winners-minus-losers (IWML). 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑖𝐼𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 (8) 
Table 3 presents the results. The 12-1 WML-alpha adjusted for the market, size, book-to-
market ratio, and industry momentum is still profitable (1.77%) and highly significant (6.91). 
Compared to the three-factor alpha of 2.47%, it is slightly reduced. However, this indicates that 
industries are merely part of the driver behind the momentum effect in the Nordics. As a further 
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 Table 3: Controlling for IWML/WML 
Reported are the mean returns in excess of the risk-free rate (NIBOR 3-month), compound monthly growth rate (CMGR), annualized Sharpe ratio and alphas from CAPM and 
the four-factor model for the zero-cost WML strategies for individual stock and industries. T-statistics are reported in parathesis. The mean return is calculated as the average 
monthly return. The CMGR is calculated as 1 + HPR raised to the power of 1 divided by number of months (373) ((1 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅)
1
373 − 1). The volatility is calculated as the 




Holding 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6 1 3 6
Mean R (%) 1,21 0,97 0,88 1,61 1,28 0,78 1,44 1,43 1,16 1,54 1,29 1,12
(3,78) (3,31) (3,36) (4,57) (3,94) (2,51) (3,27) (3,93) (3,71) (3,55) (3,34) (3,14)
CMGR (%) 1,02 0,80 0,74 1,36 1,07 0,59 1,04 1,15 0,96 1,15 0,98 0,85
Sharpe ratio 0,68 0,59 0,60 0,82 0,71 0,45 0,59 0,70 0,67 0,64 0,60 0,56
CAPM-alpha 1,49 1,21 1,12 1,90 1,53 0,99 1,38 1,38 1,21 1,62 1,29 1,08
(4,69) (4,19) (4,37) (5,45) (4,71) (3,16) (3,11) (3,72) (3,80) (3,68) (3,30) (2,98)
4-factor alpha 1,35 0,99 0,93 1,77 1,45 1,00 -0,05 0,21 0,11 -0,09 -0,13 0,23
(5,55) (4,59) (4,99) (6,91) (6,28) (4,38) (-0,13) (0,66) (0,40) (-0,23) (-0,39) (0,74)
MKT -0,36 -0,34 -0,30 -0,38 -0,35 -0,33 0,36 0,32 0,21 0,23 0,26 0,25
(-7,96) (-8,50) (-8,82) (-7,93) (-8,27) (-7,87) (4,92) (5,26) (3,96) (3,10) (4,16) (4,29)
SMB -0,44 -0,51 -0,50 -0,78 -0,73 -0,75 0,57 0,48 0,30 0,56 0,51 0,50
(-3,42) (-4,48) (-5,10) (-5,79) (-5,99) (-6,23) (2,86) (2,92) (2,12) (2,76) (2,92) (3,067)
HML -0,55 -0,48 -0,44 -0,63 -0,59 -0,55 -0,01 0,07 0,15 0,05 0,08 -0,07
(-8,60) (-8,48) (-9,34) (-9,45) (-9,70) (-8,98) (-0,09) (0,74) (2,03) (0,43) (0,81) (-0,73)
IWML/WML 0,35 0,40 0,43 0,38 0,41 0,40 0,83 0,81 0,85 0,79 0,80 0,70
(12,15) (13,23) (12,43) (12,49) (13,37) (12,02) (12,15) (13,23) (14,43) (12,49) (13,37) (12,02)













test, I flip the regression, and test the four-factor alpha of industry momentum. The results 
indicate that industry momentum is not present after controlling for individual stock 
momentum, with a reported alpha of -0.09% and a t-statistic of -0.23. The four-factor model 
captures the returns of the industry momentum strategy in its entirety, and the apparent most 
significant explanatory factor is the individual stock momentum returns. Furthermore, the 
HML-factor loses its significance when introducing WML to the regression. These results 
weaken the hypothesis that the profitability of individual stock momentum can be attributed to 
picking the right industry.  
In the United States, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find the momentum in industries to be 
the main driver behind the profitability of stock momentum, and, apart from the 12-1 individual 
stock momentum strategy, capture these effects almost entirely. Conversely, in the Nordics, all 
variations of the WML strategy stay significant when controlling for IWML, meaning the 
momentum identified in Nordic stock returns do not seem to experience the same industry 
effect as in the United States. 
To explore whether the differences in findings are not a result of methodology, I conduct an 
identical analysis on the U.S. sample. First, the individual stock momentum returns found for 
the U.S. stock market are regressed on the identified U.S. industry momentum returns using 12 
industries. See appendix 1 and 2 for results. The four-factor alpha is reported at 0.01% with a 
t-statistic of 0.04. The insignificance of the alpha indicates that in the United States, industry 
momentum explains almost all of the momentum observed in stocks. Furthermore, when 
flipping the regression, the four-factor alpha of industry momentum is reported at 0.53% with 
a t-statistic of 2.50. This means that the industry momentum strategy in the United States yields 
significant alpha after controlling for individual stock momentum, in contrast to the findings 
for the Nordics.  
The robustness of the U.S. results is tested by performing the same analysis on a wider industry 
classification system. Using 48 industries instead of 12 reduces the WML four-factor alpha to 
-0.34%, but it remains insignificant. The flipped regression yields an alpha of 0.65% with a t-
statistic of 4.35. These slight differences indicate that the results are robust to changes in 
industry classification systems in the U.S. stock market. 
Overall, in the United States, industry momentum is a more robust phenomenon than individual 
stock momentum. WML is less profitable and more susceptible to crashes compared to IWML. 
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Furthermore, in contrast to the findings for the Nordic stock market and consistent with the 
results of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), the stock momentum effect seems to be subsumed 
entirely by industry momentum and not the other way around. The finding is robust to changes 
in industry classification systems. These conflicting results necessitate further research. 
4.4 Industry-Neutral Momentum 
As the initial test indicates that industry effects do not explain the momentum observed in 
Nordic stock returns, in conflict with results from the U.S. sample and Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999), further testing is necessary. This chapter will explore whether the momentum effect is 
present in an industry-neutral universe. I follow the methodology of Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999) and create individual stock zero-cost winner-minus-loser strategies within industries. 
The test is as simple as it is relevant; if I can observe significant individual stock momentum 
within the industries, the explanation regarding industries as a possible driver for momentum 
weakens. If the within-industry momentum effect is insignificant, this strengthens the evidence 
that a momentum strategy is indeed betting on industry outperformance rather than individual 
stocks and is, as a consequence, poorly diversified.  
The problem regarding sample size must be emphasized for this test. As the Nordic sample 
only consists of approximately 1000 companies, the industries alone will, on average, only 
include 100 companies. Furthermore, throughout the sample period, some industries consist of 
as few as two companies. I deal with the sample size problem by increasing the breakpoints of 
the long and short portfolios from 10% to 30%. For Energy and Utilities, the sample size is at 
times so small that only 50% breakpoints are possible. Telecommunication Services are 
excluded entirely due to few companies and periods with no observations. These changes 
reduce the accuracy and validity of the test, but I argue that the conclusions will not be affected 
to a large degree. Additionally, as the extremes (in the top and bottom decile) significantly 
contribute to the profitability of the individual stock momentum strategy, this approach is on 
the moderate side of the spectrum. If stock momentum is identified with 30% and 50% 
breakpoints, then the effect is expected to be even more significant for deciles. 
Table 4 present the results of the tests, as well as alphas and significance. See appendix 3 for 
visualization. The inter-industry WML strategies earn significant alphas at the 5% level in nine  
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Table 4: Within-industry momentum results 
Reported are the mean returns in excess of the risk-free rate (NIBOR 3-month), compound monthly growth rate (CMGR), annualized Sharpe ratio and alphas from CAPM and 
the three-factor model. The mean return is calculated as the average monthly return. The CMGR is calculated as 1 + HPR raised to the power of 1 divided by number of months 
(373) ((1 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅)
1
373 − 1). The annualized Sharpe ratio is calculated as the mean return in excess of the risk-free rate divided by the annualized volatility. The 12-month 
formation, 1-month holding strategy is used and the zero-cost results are reported. Within the industries, the 30% past top performers are bought, and the 30% worst performers 
are sold. I skip one month after formation and calculate the returns over the following holding month. For the energy- and utilities industry, the sample size was too small, so I 
had to use 50% breakpoints, meaning I bought the top half and sold the other half. N is the total number of companies in the sector and min/max size is the minimum and 

















(4,00) (5,02) (1,97) (2,55)
(4,01) (1,87) (2,54) (2,35) (2,57) (3,69) (1,36)
(0,40)
1,91 1,02 0,93 1,34 0,20
0,78 1,24 0,68 0,96 0,65
(0,277)
0,95 1,57 0,98 1,33 0,91
1,27 0,78 0,64 1,10 0,14
(2,11)
(2,54)
(2,53) (3,15) (0,96) (2,22) (-0,06)
0,28
0,32 0,71 0,31 0,38 0,28 0,45 0,56 0,17 0,40 -0,01
1,24 0,68 0,45 1,12 -0,03
0,40 1,00 0,37 0,50
0,66 1,20 0,62 0,78 0,43
0,76 0,60 -0,19 0,54 -0,41
(1,81) (3,96) (1,72) (2,10) (1,55)
1/4
250 71 146 13
3/10 4/21 3/13 1/20 9/25 1/22 9/37 1/14 1/23
Industrials Real Estate Technology Utilities (50%)
68 128 69 88 143 113
Within-industry momentum (monthly)















































































out of ten industries. Note that the monthly three-factor alpha of the WML 12-1 strategy on the 
complete data set was reported at 2.47% with a t- statistic of above 8. However, this strategy 
used 10% breakpoints. The full-sample individual WML-strategy with 30% breakpoints 
returned a three-factor alpha of 1.47% with a t-statistic of also above 8. The returns of inter-
industry WML are on average lower and weaker, with an equal-weighted average alpha of 
1.11%, but still significant. The fact that 9 out of 10 tested industries experience momentum 
within themselves weakens the hypothesis that industry effects drive momentum, at least in its 
entirety. 
Again, the problem regarding sample size must be emphasized. These results may not be valid, 
as some industries consist of very few companies over time, resulting in cases where returns 
are only driven by two companies (one in the long and one in the short portfolio). Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999) use a much larger sample (the U.S. stock market) and can, consequently, 
divide the stocks between 20 industries. By using only 11 industries, a wide variety of 
businesses will be put in the same industry. This weakens the validity of the analysis and might 
be a reason for the identified inter-industry momentum effect.  
Similar to the findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) for the U.S. stock market, I find 
compelling evidence for the presence of industry momentum in the Nordic stock market. The 
profitability of the industry momentum strategy seems to be robust to changes in both 
formation- and holding periods and more implementable compared to individual stock 
momentum. Stock momentum is subject to high turnover and, as a consequence, higher 
transaction costs. Moskowitz and Grinblatt find stock momentum to be a result of industry 
effects, meaning industry momentum would be preferable over individual stock momentum, 
as it reduces turnover. Investors can achieve the high returns of the momentum strategy with 
lower transaction costs by using, for example, sector-specific funds instead of trading in 
individual stocks.  
In the Nordic stock market, individual stock momentum is not a result of industry momentum. 
Both momentum strategies are profitable alone, but only one stays significant when controlling 
for the other. Furthermore, significant stock momentum is observed within industries, although 
the alphas and significance are reduced slightly compared to the original momentum results. 
These findings are robust to traditional risk factors.  
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The difference in results for the United States and the Nordics may be attributed to differences 
in methodologies, as previously mentioned, but the additional tests make sample-specific 
effects more likely. The conflicting findings indicate that Moskowitz and Grinblatt did indeed 
conclude prematurely and that the behavior of momentum is highly dependent on regional 
effects. No conclusions that confirm the general industry dependency of momentum can be 
drawn.  
The findings in this chapter are relevant to more than just academics. Some practitioners in the 
Nordic stock market may need to evaluate their investment process. Consider an investor 
operating within the Nordics that utilize the findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) that 
industry momentum drives the momentum observed in stock returns. He would first pick 
industries to invest in and subsequently select stocks within these industries. If industry effects 
explain momentum, then stock selection will not contribute to additional returns. The results 
found in this chapter indicate that industry effects do not fully explain the momentum in Nordic 
stock returns, meaning that the investor can indeed exploit individual stock momentum after 
accounting for industry momentum.  
In this subchapter, industry effects were explored as a possible driver behind individual stock 
momentum. Even though an industry momentum strategy yielded high and significant returns, 
the test results indicated that industry effects were not the main driver behind the momentum 
effect observed in stock returns. However, industry effects might still be one of several drivers, 
as the alpha of individual stock momentum decreased by one percentage point when controlling 
for industry momentum. Furthermore, inter-industry momentum was less profitable and 
significant than overall momentum. In conclusion, I fail to conclude with the momentum effect 




5. Value and Momentum Combined 
Chapter 4 explored industry momentum as a possible explanation for the momentum observed 
in Nordic stock returns. This explanation would have been rational, as the individual stock 
momentum strategy would invest aggressively in outperforming industries rather than 
individual stocks, making the strategy poorly diversified. However, the hypothesis weakened 
after several tests, and I failed to conclude with industry effects being a sole driver behind 
momentum. Having to look elsewhere for possible explanations, I turn to momentum crashes. 
In the Nordic sample, both individual stock and industry momentum strategies have suffered 
from severe crashes right after the market bottomed during the financial crisis of 2008. In April 
2009 alone, the short portfolio of the individual stock momentum strategy returned an 
impressive 66% compared to the long portfolio of 20%, resulting in the WML strategy falling 
by 46%. Furthermore, from March through July 2009, the WML strategy delivered a negative 
return of just above 60%. The industry WML strategy experienced similar returns, with a 
negative return of 45% in April 2008 and a total negative return just shy of 60% during the five 
months from March through July 2009. The maximum drawdown for the industry momentum 
strategy was around 75%. The drawdown is calculated using month-end adjusted prices, 
meaning the real crashes might be significantly worse, and rational investors will limit their 
exposure to such a portfolio. Furthermore, the sudden outperformance of the short portfolio 
can theoretically result in infinite losses for the WML investor, as there is no upside cap for 
stock prices. The momentum strategy might be highly profitable but far from arbitrage. 
Momentum crashes may be a result of the risks proposed by Liu and Zhang (2008). They 
explain the momentum anomaly with higher downside risk for past winners. These stocks are 
more prone to worsening outlooks and are therefore punished in bear markets. A momentum 
strategy, which is long these stocks, is therefore affected negatively by the long positions' poor 
performance until the past winners are not the past winners anymore, thus being removed from 
the strategy. These previous past winners are then replaced by safer low-beta stocks, which 
have performed better during the downturn relative to the market. The real problem occurs 
when the market recoils, as it so often does, and the momentum strategy is long stable low-beta 
stocks and short high-beta stocks. The past losers in the short-portfolio recoil strongly, resulting 
in negative returns for the zero-cost portfolio and possible liquidity issues for the investor. 
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Daniel and Moskowitz (2013) find the momentum strategy to experience option-like behavior. 
They do, however, only explore the 12-1 strategy. Grobys (2016) supplement the work of 
Daniel and Moskowitz by exploring crashes in Europe. They find option-like behavior for their 
12-1 momentum strategy but not for their 6-1. Additionally, they found that momentum 
strategies based on more recent past performance appear more exposed to value stocks 
compared to the strategies with longer formation periods. This might indicate that value stocks 
are less subject to big crashes or counteract momentum stocks.  
Motivated by the findings of Grobys (2016), I further explore the HML-loadings and other key 
elements of the individual stock momentum strategy. Table 1 presents the results. All variations 
of the momentum strategy have negative HML-loadings, in contrast to Grobys (2016), who 
find them to be positively loaded. However, the Nordic strategies with a shorter formation 
period are less negatively loaded, albeit barely so. Furthermore, the strategies with a 6-month 
formation period seem to suffer less measured in drawdowns. These findings may suggest that 
momentum crashes can be reduced by increasing the exposure to the value factor.  
Asness (1997) discovered that a momentum strategy was strongest in growth stocks while a 
value strategy was strongest among loser stocks, resulting in a negative correlation between 
the factors. These findings were supplemented by Asness et al. (2013), who found momentum 
and value to be individually profitable and negatively correlated by 0.53 in the United States 
and 0.52 in Europe, meaning a combination of the two could potentially increase the risk-
adjusted returns significantly. I expect this relationship to be present in the Nordics as well. If 
so, a combination of momentum and value will increase diversification, as the two strategies 
most likely consist of different companies from different industries, thus reducing both 
idiosyncratic and crash risk. 
This chapter explores an investor's possibility of reducing the potential risks of holding a pure-
play momentum strategy without performance loss. Motivated by the literature discussed 
previously and the indication of reduced crash risk by increasing exposure to the HML factor 
throughout the thesis, I increase the exposure to value stocks by combining a momentum and 
value strategy. I expect such a combination to reduce risk while remaining profitable. If 




Henceforth, I utilize the individual stock momentum strategy in the combination strategies as 
this was found to be most profitable and a unique phenomenon, not a result of industry effects. 
The combination methods are subject to data-mining risks, but I argue that such risks are dealt 
with throughout the thesis. I have used the most standard and straightforward measures and 
methods to create value and momentum strategies to ensure a certain level of comparability 
among earlier research and minimize the risk of data mining or p-hacking (Chordia, Goyal, & 
Saretto, 2017). To ensure some comparability with Asness et al. (2013), the 12-1 stock 
momentum strategy and the 1-month holding value strategy will be the focus of the remainder 
of the thesis. 
5.1 Construction of the Value Strategy 
Initially, I construct the value strategy. This strategy differs from the HML-factor to ensure 
compatibility with the momentum strategy for combination considerations, and as it is believed 
to be more profitable when using 10% breakpoints. The value strategy is constructed based on 
the methodology of Fama and French (1992, 1993) and Asness et al. (2013). 
An investor looking to exploit the value-premium selects stocks based on whether they consider 
the company to be cheap or expensive. To keep the analysis simple, I use only one measure of 
value: the book-to-market (BM) ratio10. The BM ratio for any given month t, is calculated by 
dividing the book value of equity by the market value of equity. To ensure that the accounting 
data is public before the returns they are used to explain, the book value at the end of year t – 1 
is matched with returns in July of year t, following the methodology of Fama and French 
(1992). This results in a six-month lag for book values, which should be adequate. As for 
market values, the most recent observation is used, meaning the book-to-market ratio in 
month t is constructed from the book value in month t - 6 divided by the market value in 





Between the release of accounting data, the market values will be driving the change in book-
to-market ratios. This method is different from that of Fama and French (1992), as they also 
 
10 Research has identified other value-measures to have higher predictive power than the book-to-market ratio 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1994; Asness, Porter, & Ross, 2000), but as I want my results to be general, 
comparative, and not a result of data mining, I stay with this approach.  
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used the market value in the same month as their book value to calculate the book-to-market 
ratio. Asness et al. (2013) state that this choice is not expected to affect the overall results of 
the analysis. However, the correlation between value and momentum is expected to be higher 
and is the main argument for using real-time market values.  
For each month t, I construct zero-cost portfolios based on the book-to-market ratio in month t - 
1, which go long the top 10% highest BM-stocks (the cheapest stocks) and short the bottom 
10% (the most expensive stocks). This decile-sorting follows the methodology of Fama and 
French (1992), while Asness et al. (2013) sort their data into three equal groups (33% per). The 








i is the individual stocks in the portfolio, ranging from 1 to N. The stocks in the portfolio are 
equally weighted to ensure comparability to the rest of the thesis. As the sample only consists 
of the 50% largest companies measured in market value, the value premium is expected not to 
suffer from size bias. Taxes and transaction costs are not considered when calculating returns. 
The holding period for the reported value strategy is one month, but 3-, 6-, and 12-month 
strategies are explored as well. A 12-month strategy means that a created portfolio based on 
the book-to-market ratio in June year t is held from July through June the succeeding year.  
Table 5 presents the results. With a CAPM-alpha of 0.79 and a t-statistic of 2.47, the strategy 
is profitable in the Nordic stock market, although less so than the momentum strategy. Since 
one of the risk factors in the three-factor model is HML, the three-factor alpha is much lower 
and only significant at the 10% level. However, the HML factor does not explain all of the 
variations in the value strategy because of differences in construction methods. See appendix 








Table 5: Value strategy results 
Reported are the mean returns in excess of the risk-free rate (NIBOR 3-month), compound monthly growth rate 
(CMGR), annualized Sharpe ratio and alphas from CAPM and the three-factor model. The mean return is 
calculated as the average monthly return. The CMGR is calculated as 1 + HPR raised to the power of 1 divided 
by number of months (373) ((1 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅)
1
373 − 1). The annualized Sharpe ratio is calculated as the mean return in 
excess of the risk-free rate divided by the annualized volatility. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The HML 
strategy buys the cheapest companies in month t-1 and sells the most expensive. The positions are subsequently 
held for one month. The HML-column (strategy) differs from the HML-row (factor). 
 
Overall, the HML-strategy is subject to two events/trends (Figure 4). The first is the value crash 
around the year 2000 (the dot-com bubble), and the second is the strategy underperformance 
since the financial crisis of 2008. In the graph on the right, the drivers behind these effects are 
visualized. Technology stocks with low book-to-market ratios (thus being shorted in the value-
strategy) performed remarkably well during the dot-com bubble, resulting in negative returns 
for the zero-cost portfolio. The following crash resulted in an equally strong recoil for the 
strategy, which continued to outperform until the financial crisis. Thenceforth, the low book-
to-market stocks (growth stocks) have outperformed the high book-to-market stock (value 
stock), resulting in negative returns for the strategy. 
 
 
Portfolio High Low HML
Mean R (%) 1,17 0,41 0,77
(3,09) (1,29) (2,44)
CAGR (%) 0,90 0,22 0,57
Sharpe ratio 0,44 0,13 0,34
CAPM-alpha 0,24 -0,55 0,79
(0,88) (-3,41) (2,47)
3-factor alpha -0,41 -0,59 0,19
(-2,57) (-4,39) (1,43)
MKT 1,06 1,01 0,05
(35,13) (39,17) (1,80)
SMB 0,84 0,50 0,35
(9,87) (6,78) (4,86)
HML 1,07 -0,39 1,47
(26,38) (-11,33) (43,33)









Figure 4: Value strategy returns 
The left graph shows the cumulative return of the HML value-strategy. As we can see, the strategy suffers from a 
severe crash around the dotcom bubble. The graph on the right shows the long and short portfolio, and the reason 
for said crash is visualized. The short-portfolio consists of a lot of technology-companies (categorized in the 
growth decile) which performed remarkably well during the bubble. However, the recoil was just as strong and 
also driven by the short portfolio. We can also see the growth-outperformance since the financial crisis and the 
strong recoil among value stocks just after the market bottomed. 
 
5.2 Combination Methods 
Exploiting the value premium and the momentum effect can both be very profitable trading 
strategies alone. The nature of value and momentum is largely opposite and therefore attracts 
different types of investors. A traditional value investor often has a long-term perspective, 
while a momentum investor is more focused on the short-term price movements. The two 
strategies do not usually work at the same time, but they are still both profitable. As a value 
and momentum strategy is negatively correlated in the United States and Europe, a combination 
should decrease volatility while remaining profitable (Asness, Moskowitz, & Pedersen, 2013). 
A quick test confirms that this is evident in the Nordics as well, and I find the 12-1 momentum 
strategy and the value strategy to be negatively correlated by 0.50, similar to the findings of 
Asness et al. (2013). 
Asness et al. combine value and momentum using a 50/50-approach, meaning they construct a 
portfolio that returns the average of the two zero-cost portfolios. Fisher et al. (2016) propose a 
simultaneous selection method where the stocks are ranked on both value and momentum 
simultaneously depending on their book-to-market ratio and cumulative past return relative to 
the other stocks in the sample. They look at long-only strategies, meaning there is a new 
potentially unexplored element to this strategy. The idea behind the simultaneous selection is 
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not to exclude stocks lagging in one of the measures, allowing stock with a good performance 
in either value or momentum to score relatively high. Stocks that are neither value nor 
momentum stocks can also be part of the portfolio, as long as they score relatively high in both 
measures.  
This chapter will explore both a weighted approach and a simultaneous selection approach. I 
argue that these two methods are straightforward and implementable, as well as outside the risk 
of data mining. Changes made to the methodology of Fisher et al. (2016) will be explained in 
subsection 5.2.2.  
5.2.1 Weighted Combination 
The methodology behind the weighted combination of the value and momentum zero-cost 
portfolios is reasonably straightforward. For every month t, I weigh the returns of momentum 
and value equally in a new portfolio, meaning I hold half a momentum portfolio and half a 
value portfolio: 
 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑅𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑅𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚,𝑡 (11) 
Weights of 50% are used to keep it simple. If successful, this strategy should decrease volatility 
drastically while remaining reasonably profitable.  
Table 6 presents the results. The monthly raw excess return is between the value and 
momentum results, as one should expect, and highly significant with a t-statistic of 7. 
Furthermore, the three-factor alpha is 1.31% and highly significant. See appendix 5 for results 
when controlling for the momentum-factor (WML) as well. The most impressive thing is the 
risk-adjusted returns. The reported annualized Sharpe ratio is 1.27, meaning the strategy yields 
1.27 units of excess returns per unit of risk. Compared to the Sharpe ratios of the momentum- 
and value strategy of 0.75 and 0.34, respectively, this is a significant improvement.  
It is a clear difference between momentum and value individually and the combined portfolio 
(Figure 5). Both volatility and crashes are almost removed entirely. The maximum drawdown 
for the combined strategy is reported at just shy of 23%, far less than for the strategies 
individually. This drawdown occurred during the dotcom bubble, as the value strategy fell 
significantly more than the momentum strategy rose. Still, compared to the crash risk of the 
original strategies, the 50/50 combination has mitigated the risk almost entirely. 
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Table 6: Combination-method results 
Reported are the mean returns in excess of the risk-free rate (NIBOR 3-month), compound monthly growth rate 
(CMGR), annualized Sharpe ratio and alphas from CAPM and the three-factor model for the individual stock 
momentum strategy, value strategy, 50/50 combination strategy and the simultaneous selection strategy. The mean 
return is calculated as the average monthly return. The CMGR is calculated as 1 + HPR raised to the power of 1 
divided by number of months (373) ((1 + 𝐻𝑃𝑅)
1
373 − 1). The annualized Sharpe ratio is calculated as the mean 
return in excess of the risk-free rate divided by the annualized volatility. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
Figure 5: 50/50 strategy returns 
The graph shows the combined strategy and its obvious advantage compared to value and momentum individually. 
The value crash of year 2000 and the momentum crash of 2009 has been eliminated entirely. Furthermore, the 
combined strategy is low in volatility and still very profitable. 
      
Strategy: Momentum Value 50/50
Portfolio: Zero-Cost Zero-Cost Zero-Cost Long Short Zero-Cost
Mean R (%) 1,61 0,77 1,19 1,12 -0,55 1,67
(4,57) (2,44) (7,06) (3,89) (-1,64) (6,65)
CAGR (%) 1,36 0,57 1,13 0,96 -0,74 1,54
Sharpe 0,82 0,34 1,27 0,70 -0,30 1,20
CAPM alpha 1,90 0,79 1,34 0,38 -1,54 1,92
(5,45) (2,47) (8,14) (1,95) (-8,39) (7,82)
3-factor alpha 2,47 0,19 1,31 0,12 -1,75 1,87
(8,29) (1,43) (8,48) (0,73) (-9,74) (8,03)
MKT -0,42 0,05 -0,19 0,77 1,05 -0,28
(-7,34) (1,80) (-6,21) (23,91) (31,06) (-6,41)
SMB -0,81 0,35 -0,23 0,26 0,56 -0,29
(-5,06) (4,86) (-2,76) (2,85) (5,72) (-2,32)
HML -0,88 1,47 0,30 0,50 0,06 0,44
(-11,48) (43,33) (7,33) (11,49) (1,26) (7,45)










5.2.2 Simultaneous Selection 
In the previous subchapter, I find the simple weighted average to improve risk-adjusted returns 
significantly. This chapter explores whether a more sophisticated method of combination will 
improve performance further. I implement the simultaneous selection method for the Nordic 
market, but as a zero-cost strategy, not long-only as in Fisher et al. (2016). This will 
complement existing research and highlight the drivers behind the potential excess returns.  
Every month t, I sort the stocks based on their book-to-market ratio in t-1, assigning them 
rankings from 0 to 1, where the most expensive company (worst) gets a score of 0, and the 
cheapest company (best) gets a score of 1. This procedure is repeated for the momentum 
measure (the cumulative return from t-12 to t-2). Next, I weigh these two scores equally, 
resulting in a final score for that stock between 0 and 1. A final sort is completed based on this 
new total score, and the top 10% performers are allocated to the long portfolio and the bottom 
10% in the short portfolio.  
The method of simultaneously ranking stocks based on both momentum and value is expected 
to outperform either strategy alone and the weighted combination. This strategy is more open 
to stocks with only reasonably good performance in both measures. From Table 6, we can see 
that this is correct, as the simultaneous selection approach delivers the highest raw excess 
returns. However, the Sharpe ratio is slightly reduced compared to the weighted combination, 
and the maximum drawdown is around 30%. Although the risk-adjusted returns and crash 
mitigation are slightly worse than for the weighted combination, the strategy still outperforms 
both momentum and value alone, making it more appealing to investors with reasonable risk-
aversion.  
As an additional test, the strategy's returns are controlled for individual stock momentum, in 
addition to the three factors of Fama and French (see appendix 5). The alpha is reduced from 
1.87% (t-stat of 8.03) to 0.46% (t-stat of 2.67), meaning that the simultaneous selection strategy 
still produces abnormal returns, even after controlling for the two factors from which it is 
constructed. Clearly, this method of combination has some invisible synergy effects.  
An interesting finding is that the short portfolio is the driver of most of the abnormal returns. 
As the original article looked at long-only strategies, this contributes significantly to existing 
research. From Table 6, we can see that the three-factor alpha of the long portfolio is 
insignificant. However, the alpha of the short-portfolio is highly negative with an abnormal 
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return of -1.75% with a t-statistic of -9.74. This is visualized in Figure 6. Companies that 
simultaneously score well in both momentum and value measures seem to move fairly in line 
with the market. Conversely, expensive and underperforming companies over the last year 
significantly underperform the subsequent month as well. The long-portfolio seems to be 
betting on fairly low-beta, average-sized value-companies, and the short-portfolio consists of 
market-beta, slightly bigger, and averaged-priced stocks. 
Figure 6: Simultaneous selection strategy returns 
The left graph shows the cumulative return of the simultaneous selection strategy. As we can see, the strategy is 
highly profitable and outperform the market. The momentum- and value crashes are also almost eliminated 
entirely. The graph on the right shows the long and short portfolio and the reason for the great performance is 
visualized. The short-portfolio delivers highly negative returns, while the long-portfolio perform similar to the 
market. 
 
From Figure 6, we can see that the reported drawdown does not occur in any of the traditional 
value or momentum crashes discussed above. The 30% drawdown is the effect of the long 
portfolio falling more than the market during the Corona crash of March 2020 and the short 
portfolio significantly outperforming in the succeeding period. The strategy is short stocks with 
poor average scores on value and momentum. From Figures 2 and 4, we can see that the past 
losers performed relatively good compared to the market, and that the growth stocks 
significantly outperformed value after the crash. These companies experienced a significant 
boost during the recoil as interest rates dropped to a record low, making their future potential 
cash flow increase in value.  
A further benefit of the combination of value and momentum is that the value strategy is more 
slow-moving, meaning that the book-to-market ratio does not fluctuate the same way as past 
returns. Consequently, the value strategy replaces the companies less frequently, reducing 
transaction costs. This thesis has already accounted for liquidity by removing the 50% smallest 
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companies measured in market capitalization from the sample every month. Thus, only stocks 
that are subject to low transaction costs remain. However, institutional investors still incur costs 
when implementing a momentum strategy, and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) estimated a semi-
annual turnover of 84.8% for the U.S. WML portfolio. After incorporating a one-way 
transaction cost of 0.5%, the strategy's return was reduced to 9.29% annually. In today's high-
tech world, costs relating to transactions have been reduced significantly, making them less 
relevant for the conclusions. However, the increased exposure to value stocks affects turnover 
directly and reduces transaction costs, making the strategies even more appealing. Conversely, 
as I find the short positions to drive almost all of the abnormal returns, the profitability of this 
strategy is subject to higher costs relating to short-selling, dampening the turnover effect. 
In summary, the combination of momentum and value is highly profitable and more 
implementable than momentum alone. The risk-adjusted returns are drastically increased, and 
for the simultaneous selection strategy, the raw excess returns also surpass that of the individual 
stock momentum strategy. In conclusion, the combination of momentum and value increases 
profitability, reduces volatility, improves diversification, and mitigates crash risk. It seems like 
the increased returns come at less risk. This makes the combination of momentum and value a 




This thesis explores the individual stock momentum effect in the Nordic, whether industry 
effects explain the anomaly, and practical ways to minimize the risks related to momentum 
investing by increasing exposure to value stocks. All thoroughly explained throughout the 
thesis, a mixture of different methodologies is used to achieve the most valid and accurate 
results.  
First, I construct a pure-play momentum strategy in the Nordics. The strategy yields significant 
excess returns in all tested variations but with an unmistakable performance boost when using 
a 12-1 strategy. This strategy yields a raw monthly excess return of 1.61% and a three-factor 
alpha of 2.47%, both being highly significant. Although this looks pretty profitable, also 
adjusted for volatility (Sharpe ratio of 0.82), the strategy experiences a severe crash during the 
sample period, making it unappealing to investors with reasonable risk-aversion. 
Next, I explore industry momentum as the main explanatory factor for the momentum observed 
in Nordic stock returns. The findings of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) are expected to be 
evident for the Nordic stock market. Following their methodology, with some adjustments to 
cope with the sample size and inspired by more recent studies, industry momentum strategies 
are tested in the same variations as with individual stock momentum. The 12-1 industry 
momentum strategy is highly profitable with a monthly raw excess return of 1.54% and a three-
factor alpha of 1.84%. The Sharpe ratio of 0.64 was a tad below. Next, I conduct tests to explore 
whether the identified industry momentum explains the individual stock momentum. The first 
test is to control for industry momentum in a four-factor model. The individual stock 
momentum alpha is reduced to 1.78% but still highly significant (6.95), indicating that 
industries may not have such a big effect on stock momentum as initially thought. Moreover, 
when flipping the regression, the industry momentum alpha is wiped out completely (-0.09%) 
and not significant (-0.23). As these results were in conflict with the findings of Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt (1999), another test is conducted as a provisional measure. The profitability and 
significance of industry-neutral momentum strategies are tested by creating stock momentum 
strategies within industries. The results indicate that the momentum effect is present within 
industries, further weakening the original hypothesis.  
These test results indicate that industries have only a small effect on individual stock 
momentum in the Nordic stock market. If industries do not explain momentum, then the 
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individual stock momentum strategy may not be as poorly diversified as initially thought. The 
differences in results compared to Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) may be attributed to 
methodology. In an attempt to test the Nordic findings out-of-sample, the same analysis is 
conducted on the U.S. stock market, using data from Kenneth French's website. The obtained 
results indicate that individual stock momentum in the United States is far less profitable than 
in the Nordics. Furthermore, U.S. industry momentum seems like a more robust phenomenon, 
and is comparable to the Nordics' industry momentum effect. When regressing the individual 
U.S. WML returns on traditional risk factors in the United States and industry momentum 
returns, the alpha turns insignificant. Conversely, industry momentum remains significant 
when controlling for individual stock momentum. These findings indicate that the difference 
in results stems from sample-specific effects, more specifically, regional effects. Consequently, 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt concluded prematurely when generally naming industries as the main 
driver behind the momentum in stock returns, as this may be a local finding in the U.S. stock 
market. I argue that the poor performance of the individual WML strategy in the U.S. stock 
market in recent years results from more momentum investors trying to exploit the anomaly, 
reducing the profitability of the strategy. As initially stated in this thesis, the Nordic stock 
market is younger, smaller, and less liquid, thus not having the same popularity among WML 
traders. 
In another attempt to explain the anomaly rationally, I explore momentum crashes, inspired by 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2016). I find the crashes to be severe for both individual stock- and 
industry momentum, meaning rational investors will limit their position in such a portfolio. 
These crashes may explain some of the alphas identified, but it has become more evident that 
there is a behavioral aspect to explaining the momentum anomaly.  
Asness et a. (2013) find momentum and value to be individually profitable and negatively 
correlated by 0.53 in the U.S. equity market. The Nordic strategies are negatively correlated by 
0.50. Two combination methods are explored: a simple weighted average approach as in 
Asness et al. and a more sophisticated simultaneous selection method inspired by Fisher et al. 
Both strategies perform remarkably well regarding risk-adjusted returns, and the weighted 
average yield a Sharpe ratio of 1.27 while the simultaneous selection approach yield a ratio of 
1.20. Additionally, the simultaneous selection method significantly outperforms in raw excess 
returns, making this the most profitable strategy explored. Furthermore, the risk of crashes seen 
in both the momentum- and value strategy was removed entirely, and the possible poor 
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diversification issues due to industry dependency are resolved. Consequently, the combination 
of momentum and value yields higher and more significant returns while also reducing 
volatility, removing crash risk, and improving diversification.  
The exiting future now is when value stocks become momentum stocks. From November 2020 
until the date of thesis delivery (although not visual in the sample), the value stocks have 
significantly outperformed the growth stocks. This change in investor sentiment and rotation 
towards more cyclical companies makes for an exciting period. When the past 12-month 
returns for the value stocks are relatively better than the market, WML traders move positions 
away from growth stocks into value stocks. Traditional value investors stay long-term, thus not 
changing away from value stocks unless the high performance makes them relatively 
expensive. Consequently, more capital is allocated to value stocks, thus increasing the 
performance of the combined strategies even further. Then again, the correlation between 
momentum and value is reduced, resulting in less hedging against crash risk. Conversely, the 
growth stocks become part of a vicious circle. In recent months, these stocks have suffered 
from increased interest rates and investor sentiment, and when WML traders are forced out of 
these stocks due to strategy constraints, their suffering will prolong. 
In summary, this thesis identifies significant momentum in Nordic stock returns, not explained 
by traditional risk factors or industry effects as proposed by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). 
However, industries may be one of several contributors, as the alpha of the individual stock 
momentum strategy was slightly reduced when controlling for industry momentum. Since 
evidence of poor diversification resulting from industry dependency remains unobserved, 
momentum crashes are explored as another possible rational explanation. The crashes for both 
stock- and industry momentum are severe, which reduced the attractiveness of the strategies. 
However, when increasing the strategy's exposure to value stocks through combination 
methods, the crashes are almost removed entirely and the profitability increase further. The 
momentum anomaly may be challenging to explain, but the combination of momentum and 
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Strategy WML 12-IWML 48-IWML
Mean R (%) 0,43 0,62 0,73
1,13 (2,25) (3,83)
CMGR (%) 0,10 0,45 0,65
Sharpe ratio 0,20 0,41 0,69
CAPM-alpha 0,73 0,80 0,85
(1,95) (2,94) (4,45)
3-factor alpha 0,75 0,86 0,88
(2,02) (3,23) (4,68)
MKT -0,38 -0,35 -0,20
(-4,40) (-5,45) (-4,53)
SMB -0,29 0,31 0,10
(-2,21) (3,33) (1,53)
HML -0,23 -0,19 -0,14
(-1,97) (-2,30) (-2,48)







Strategy WML 12-IWML 48-IWML
Mean R (%) 0,43 0,62 0,73
1,13 (2,25) (3,83)
CMGR (%) 0,10 0,45 0,65
Sharpe ratio 0,20 0,41 0,69
CAPM-alpha 0,73 0,80 0,85
(1,95) (2,94) (4,45)
3-factor alpha 0,01 0,53 0,65
(0,04) (2,50) (4,35)
MKT -0,09 -0,17 -0,08
(-1,28) (-3,40) (-2,21)
SMB -0,55 0,43 0,19
(-5,30) (5,88) (3,72)
HML -0,65 -0,09 -0,07
(-0,71) (-1,37) (-1,58)
12IWML/WML 0,86 0,44 0,32
(14,80) (14,80) (15,36)



























Strategy: Momentum Value 50/50 Average ranking
Mean R (%) 1,21 0,77 1,19 1,67
(3,78) (2,44) (7,06) (6,65)
CAGR (%) 1,02 0,57 1,13 1,54
Sharpe 0,68 0,34 1,27 1,20
CAPM alpha 1,49 0,79 1,34 1,92
(4,69) (2,47) (8,14) (7,82)
3/4-factor alpha 1,86 0,19 0,15 0,46
(6,60) (1,43) (2,08) (2,67)
MKT -0,33 0,05 0,01 -0,04
(-6,18) (1,80) (1,01) (-1,32)
SMB -0,34 0,35 0,16 0,17
(-2,24) (4,86) (4,23) (1,90)
HML -0,77 1,47 0,71 0,95
(-10,72) (43,33) (36,35) (20,30)
WML - - 0,48 0,57
(41,61) (21,00)
Max DD (%) 49,73 79,98 22,82 29,26
Strategies Combined
Nordic 
(January 
1990 to 
January 
2021)
